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COMMENTS
CLARIFYING THE AMENDING PROCESS
NOEL T. DOWLING*
In a decision' accompanied by a series of opinions last Term, the
Supreme Court put a new complexion on the legal features of the pro-
cess of amending the Constitution. Hitherto the question whether an
amendment had been properly and seasonably adopted was, by assump-
tion if not by actual decision, cognizable in and determinable by the
Court, though the principles governing the determination were by no
means clear or settled. Today the question is one for Congress. It has
ceased to be justiciable. It has become political.
This bit of transmutation was not accomplished with the greatest
of ease. Two cases were argued together 2 in October, 19,8, but, while
other cases submitted then and thereafter were readily disposed of in
the normal period of six weeks to two months, nothing was heard of
these. At that time the Court had only eight members, no successor to
Mr. Justice Cardozo having been appointed, and it was believed that
they were equally divided on the question of jurisdiction. After the ap-
pointment of Mr. Frankfurter it was expected that the cases would be
set down for re-argument, but the retirement of Mr. Justice Brandeis
again reduced the Court to eight. Finally, on April 17, the day on which
Mr. Justice Douglas took his seat to make a full bench of nine, the re-
argument was begun. Seven weeks later, June 5, the decision came
down. Four opinions were delivered, the prevailing one by Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes (joined by Justices Stone and Reed), a concurring one
by Mr. Justice Black (joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and
Douglas), a separate one by Mr. Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices
Roberts, Black and Douglas), and a dissenting one by Mr. Justice But-
ler (joined by Mr. Justice McReynolds).
The case which called forth this bevy of opinions presented a single
issue, namely, whether or not the ratification of the Child Labor
Amendment by Kansas was valid. In the period which had elapsed since
the submission of the amendment in 1924 the State had first (1925) re-
jected the proposal and thereafter (197) accepted it. A suit was begun
to test the legality of such action and two separate questions were de-
veloped in the litigation; first, was a State bound by its first vote, so that
*Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
'Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939).
2Chandler v. Wise, 307 U. S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992 (1939), was the other, but as will
appear later, it was dismissed without consideration of the merits.
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after having voted No it could not vote Yes, and, second, was the pro-
posed amendment "dead" by reason of the passage of so many years
since its submission, notwithstanding the absence of any time limit in
the proposing resolution. The highest court of Kansas had answered
both questions in the negative, and sustained the ratification.3 This
judgment was affined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
4
On the first question, the effect of the previous rejection of the
amendment, the Court deemed the matter settled by "historic prece-
dent." This precedent was created by the action of Congress and the
Secretary of State in proclaiming the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The legislatures of some of the States, including North
Carolina and South Carolina, had first rejected and then ratified the
Amendment, while in at least two other States, Ohio and New Jersey,
the legislatures first ratified and then passed resolutions withdrawing
their consent. Congress, informed of these facts by a report from the
Secretary of State, adopted a Concurrent Resolution which declared the
Fourteenth Amendment to be a part of the Constitution, all four of the
above named States being included in the list of those which had rati-
fied. Thereupon the Secretary of State issued his proclamation which
also included those States.
Thus, as the Court points out, the "political departments of the
Government" had dealt not only with the first question here involved
but also with the related one whether prior ratification could be re-
voked, and had determined that both previous rejection and attempted
withdrawal "were ineffectual in the presence of an actual ratification."5
Declaring that this decision by the political departments as to the
validity of the Fourteenth Amendment "has been accepted," the Court
added:
"We think that in accordance with this historic precedent
the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in
the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should
be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political de-
partments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the
'In the Chandler case similar questions were involved concerning ratification by
Kentucky. The Court of Appeals of that State answered both questions in the af-
firmative, and overturned the ratification.
'Thus the judgments in both cases were left standing, that of Kansas (for ratifi-
cation) because the Supreme Court thought it was right, and that of Kentucky
(against ratification) because the Court, there being no justiciable question, could
not say whether it was right or wrong.
5The Court noted that there were "special circumstances" because of the action
of Congress in relation to the governments of the rejecting States but said that these-
circumstances "were not recited in proclaiming ratification."
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exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of
the amendment."
The Court then stated the "precise question" in the case to be
"whether, when the legislature of the State, as we have found, has ac-
tually ratified the proposed amendment, the Court should restrain the
State officers from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State,
because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the question from
coming before the political departments"; and answered it: "We find
no basis in either Constitution or statute for such judicial action."
The second question, as to whether the proposal by Congress had
lost its vitality through lapse of time, was found by the Court to be
"more serious" than the first. Dillon v. Gloss6 brought on the difficulty.
In that case, as the Court now re-affirms, it was held that Congress in
proposing an amendment may fix a reasonable time for ratification.7
But much more was said in the opinion. Thus it was suggested that
amendments would not remain open to ratification for all time, that
ratification must be sufficiently contemporaneous in the required num-
ber of States to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively
the same period, and that ratification must be within some reasonable
time after the proposal.
These considerations, and others not necessary to be recited here,
were "cogent reasons," said the Court, for sustaining the power of Con-
gress to fix a reasonable time, but they must not be taken as indicating
that, when Congress does not exercise that power, the Court should
take upon itself the responsibility of deciding what constitutes a rea-
sonable time. No such question was presented in Dillon v. Gloss and
the Court did not consider itself foreclosed from examining the matter
on the merits.
The question of a reasonable time, said the Court, would involve an
appraisal of "a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social, and
economic," which are appropriate for the consideration of the political
departments of Government. Indeed the Chief Justice suggests that
these conditions "can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range
of evidence receivable in a court of justice" and as to them "it would be
an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice"
6256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510 (1921).
7Actually, as Professor Freund pointed out at the time, Legislative Problems and
Solutions (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 656, that was not the holding. The seven year limit
in that case had been inserted by Congress in the text of the amendment itself (it
was the Eighteenth); it was not a part of the proposing Resolution. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes calls attention to the fact that no limitation of time in respect of the Child
Labor Amendment appears "either in the proposed amendment or in the resolution
of submission."
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as the basis of deciding the controversy. The questions they involve are
"essentially political and not justiciable."
"Our decision that the Congress has the power under Article
V to fix a reasonable limit of time for ratification in proposing
an amendment proceeds upon the assumption that the question,
what is a reasonable time, lies within the congressional province.
If it be deemed that such a question is an open one when the
limit has not been fixed in advance, we think that it should also
be regarded as an open one for the consideration of the Congress
when, in the presence of certified ratifications by three-fourths
of the States, the time arrives for the promulgation of the adop-
tion of the amendment. The decision by the Congress, in its con-
trol of the action of the Secretary of State, of the question
whether the amendment had been adopted within a reasonable
time would not be subject to review by the courts."
On both points, then, the Chief Justice concluded that the de-
termining power rested in Congress rather than in the courts. But either
he was not categorical enough or else he said too much to satisfy Mr.
Justice Black and the three associates who joined with him. In their
view control of the amending process has been given by the Constitu-
tion "exclusively and completely" to Congress. They considered the
process as "political" in its entirety, from the submission of an amend-
ment to its adoption, and they denied that it is "subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point." Consequently they
looked on any judicial expression which amounted to "more than mere
acknowledgment of exclusive Congressional power" as a "mere ad-
monition to the Congress in the nature of an advisory opinion, given
wholly without constitutional authority."
The bare fact that the Court discussed the matter at all, as against
dismissing the cause forthwith and completely as a political question,
evidently gave them some concern. In fact they insisted that the Court
"treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as
subject to judicial construction." They wanted an express disapproval
of the "conclusion arrived at in Dillon v. Gloss thatthe Constitution
impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die un-
less ratified within a 'reasonable time'," together with a disapproval of
the Court's "prior assumption of power to make such a pronounce-
ment."
In the separate opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter the position was
taken that the parties had "no standing in this Court" and that the
cause should be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting, stood squarely on the conclusiorr
which he quoted from Dillon v. Gloss, namely, that "the fair inference
Vol. I
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or implication from Article V is that ratification must be within some
reasonable time after the proposal." In his judgment, upon the reason-
ing of the opinion in that case, "more than a reasonable time had
elapsed." Also, declaring that the non-justiciable character of the ques-
tion had not been raised or argued at the bar, he urged that no de-
cision should be rendered on the point that the Court lacks power to
determine what is a reasonable time for ratification.
-In the companion case of Chandler v. Wise, already referred to,
which brought up on certiorari similar questions concerning the valid-
ity of Kentucky's ratification and which had held the ratification in-
valid, the writ was dismissed on the ground that after the Governor
"had forwarded the certification of the ratification of the amendment
to the Secretary of State of the United States there was no longer a
controversy susceptible of judicial determination." Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, referred to the opinion by the
former in the Kansas case and added: "We do not believe that state or
federal courts have any jurisdiction to interfere with the amending
process." s Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler thought that
the Kentucky judgment should be affirmed on the authority of Dillon
v. Gloss.
The result of it all seems to be: first, that the Court considers the
law already settled by "historic precedent" to the effect that a state can
change its vote from No to Yes (the same precedent refused a change
from Yes to No), and, second, that the Court will have nothing to do
with determining what is a reasonable time for ratification.
The first of these results itself involves something akin to a decision
on the merits. That is to say, when the Court declared that the historic
precedent of the Fourteenth Amendment "has been accepted" it was
in that very declaration making a pronouncement on the law. And it
will be recalled that the Court retained jurisdiction of the Kansas case
and affirmed the judgment, "but upon," as it added, "the grounds stated
in this'opinion."
Whether the Child Labor Amendment is now to be listed among
the quick or the dead, we do not know.9 That puzzle still survives not-
withstanding the elaborate discussion of the general problem in the
present case. But the opinions do point the way for those who would
81t will be noticed that while Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion in the Kansas case concerning the political
character of the question they did not join in the present declaration of no juris-
diction.
9Four other amendments have been proposed, two in 1789, one in 18io, and one
in 1861, and are "outstanding" in the sense that they have not been ratified.
1940]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
like to know what rules shall govern the game of amending the Con-
stitution. The rules must be made by Congress, unless peradventure
Congress, eschewing rules, prefers to leave all questions open for de-
cision if and whenever they may arise in connection with the ratifica-
tion of any given amendment. But surely the law on such a basic mat-
ter as amending the Constitution ought to be known in advance; and
the judicial branch has here passed full responsibility over to the legis-
lative.
Congress has done singularly little on the subject. Today the total
statutory content consists of one provision to the effect that it is the
duty of the Secretary of State to proclaim the adoption of an amend-
ment whenever he has received official notice that the requisite num-
ber of States have ratified it.10 Even that provision was not thought
heretofore to have any striking legal significance, for the Secretary's
proclamation was treated, not as necessary to ratification, but as a means
of giving publicity to a result already accomplished. Dillon v. Gloss
was decided on the theory that ratification is complete as soon as the
last State required to make up the three-fourths has accepted the
amendment; furthermore, the Court will take judicial notice of such
state action."' The episode of December, 1933, may be recalled when,
with ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment already completed in
35 States, the thirty-sixth staged a performance not far from theatrical
in putting an end to prohibition.
But perhaps that feature of Dillon v. Gloss must also be taken with
reservation in the light of the new views of the Court. And one wonders
whether the same must be said of Hawke v. Smith,12 National Prohibi-
tion Cases,13 and United States v. Sprague,14 where the, Court dealt
"The text of the provision is as follows: "Whenever official notice is received at
the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the
United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the
Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published, with his
certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been adopted, and that
the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution
of the United States." 5 U. S. C. 16o, from an Act of April 20, 1818.
uThus, with regard to the Eighteenth Amendment whose effective date was in-
volved in the case, the Court said: "Its ratification, of which we take judicial notice,
was consummated January 16, gig. That the Secretary of State did not proclaim its
ratification until January 29, igig, is not material, for the date of its consummation,
and not that on which it is proclaimed, controls." (256 U. S. at 376.) To the same
effect, United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217, 222 (1934), concerning the effective
date of the Twenty-first as repealing the Eighteenth.
2253 U. S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495 (1920)-
2,253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486 (1920).
"258 U. S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217 (1922).
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with the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment; and of Leser v. Gar-
nett,15 involving the validity of the Nineteenth. In all these cases the
Court passed on questions of procedure or substance, though it must
be said that they were decided in the absence of any explicit congres-
sional legislation on the points involved.16
The way is open, and the responsibility clear, for clarifying the
amending process by a comprehensive statute. Could Congress, not-
withstanding the historic precedent, now prescribe that a State's first
vote on a proposed amendment shall be final, whether No or Yes,
'282 U. S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 220 (1930).
"These cases covered features of the Eighteenth Amendment other than the time
factor discussed in Dillon v. Gloss. Thus in Hawke v. Smith it was held that when
Congress submits an amendment for ratification by legislatures a State has no au-
thority to require the submission of ratification to a referendum under the State
Constitution; consequently, as sought in the case, an injunction should issue against
the spending of public money for that purpose. Here the Court passed on the mean-
ing of the term "Legislatures" in Article V. In the National Prohibition Cases, which
comprised seven suits each seeking an injunction against the execution of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, the Court, in the face
of elaborate argument to the contrary, concluded, inter alia, that the substance of
the Amendment "is within the power to amend reserved by Article V" and that the
"Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Con-
stitution." United States v. Sprague was an appeal by the Government from an order
of the federal court in New Jersey quashing an indictment for violation of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. That court, entertaining the view that the convention method
was requisite for such an amendment, held that the amendment (ratified by legis-
latures) had not been validly adopted. In reversing this judgment the Supreme
Court, reiterating what was said in the National Prohibition Cases, declared that it
rests solely in the discretion of Congress to make the choice of method of ratifica-
tion. In Leser v. Garnett the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a Maryland
court dismissing a petition to require election officers to strike the names of specified
women voters from the registration list. The contention was made that the extension
of suffrage to women was so great an addition to the electorate that, absent the
State's consent (Maryland had refused to ratify), it would destroy the State's au-
tonomy as a political body, and hence did not lie within the amending power. Other
contentions were that limitations either in state constitutions or in legislative pro-
cedure had not been complied with and that noncompliance made the ratifications
ineffective. All these contentions were considered and rejected.
Prior to these cases, Professor Orfield writes, the only instance in which the Su-
preme Court had passed on the validity of an amendment was Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798), concerning the Eleventh. Even there, however, he says,
the question had to do with the procedure by which the Amendment was adopted,
not with its content; and no point was made or discussed that the question was a
political one. In a later case, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), Professor Orfield
adds, the Court declared in dictum that it was political. As far as state courts are
concerned he finds that the decisions have been "virtually unanimous to the effect
that the question is judicial." He concludes that "it is not peculiar" that the Su-
preme Court "when it came to passing on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments was prepared to view the issue as judicial." The Federal Amending Power:
Genesis and Justiciability (1930) 14 Minn. L. Rev. 369, 374, 379-
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thus preventing a shift in either direction? Presumably such action lies
within the competency of Congress under the view expressed by the
Chief Justice that the "question of the efficacy of ratifications by state
legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal,
should be regarded as a political question." Certainly full Congres-
sional freedom would be acceptable to Mr. Justice Black. Doubless
Congress could authorize the Secretary of State to make the determina-
tion, on grounds fixed by the statute, whether an amendment has been
adopted or rejected, and to proclaim the result. That would give
potency and dignity to the Secretary's proclamation. And much can be
said for making proclamations operate on a two-way street: ratification
when three-fourths of the States signify their acceptance; rejection
when more than one-fourth signify the contrary.
Congress might strike out on other lines for the purpose of making
the adoption or rejection of amendments depend upon a nation-wide
and substantially direct vote of the people. Thus, it might declare a
national policy that all amendments hereafter proposed shall be sub-
mitted for ratification or rejection by state conventions instead of leg-
islatures, and provide that delegates to such conventions be chosen at
elections, general or special, held throughout the country on a given
date; that the election of delegates be accompanied by a state-wide
referendum on the adoption of the amendment, the result thereof to
bind the delegates; and that the conventions assemble and vote within
a specified time after the election.
To a considerable extent that method was tried and found satisfac-
tory in the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the only amend-
ment so far ratified by conventions.17 There, however, the individual
States, not Congress, enacted legislation embodying one or more of the
above noted provisions concerning the election of delegates and the
procedure of the conventions. The question whether Congress had
power to legislate along those lines was debated in the House when
the resolution submitting the amendment was under consideration, and
the House was divided in opinion.'8
Large questions of power and policy are involved in any assertion
17See A New Experiment in Ratification (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 383.
"Such legislation has been urged by publicists from time to time, and at least
one Bill has been introduced in Congress to that end. The Bill was introduced by
Mr. Wadsworth of New York in the 74th Congress. H. R. 29oo, and again in the 75 th
Congress, H. R. 299. Remarks of Mr. Wadsworth on the subject of the Bill will be




of congressional authority touching elections in the States. Manifestly it
is a matter of great delicacy in federal relationships. But within the
limited area of the election of convention delegates the question of
power, whatever may be said for or against the propriety of its exer-
cise, wears a different aspect since the Child Labor Amendment de-
cision was rendered.' 9
Even if Congress should resolve the issues of power and policy fa-
vorably and enact a law calling for the convention method and making
general provision for the conventions, the legislative program would
still be incomplete. Further legislation would be necessary in the States
themselves, complementary to the Congressional, to provide the local
machinery for the election of the delegates and to set it in motion upon
the submission of an amendment.
Legislation of that character in the States is needed whether Congress
passes such a law as the above or not. It is needed, that is, if the States
are to be equipped to proceed without delay in the event that Congress
should submit an amendment and, as it did in the case of the Twenty-
first, specify merely that it be ratified by conventions instead of by leg-
islatures. Up to that time no laws had been passed under which such
a constitutional convention could be assembled. And if it had not been
for the efforts of individuals and private organizations it is likely that
the formulation of the necessary statutes would have been considerably
retarded. Even so, only sixteen States made their statutes general in
character, that is, designed to become operative whenever Congress
submits an amendment for ratification by conventions. The remainder
shaped their laws solely with regard to the proposed Twenty-first
Amendment; and those laws, their function in the ratification of that
Amendment hiving been performed, are dead letters now. They of
course furnish guides for legislative action if further proposals should be
submitted, but the point is that new state legislation would be neces-
sary. At the present time not more than one-thirdl of the States are
ready' to proceed by the convention method for the consideration of
proposed amendments.
I A surprisingly sympathetic attitude towards national power was taken by the
States when they enacted statutes to provide for conventions to deal with repeal of
prohibition. About half of those statutes contained a provision to the effect that if
Congress should prescribe the manner in which the conventions shall be constituted
and should not make an exception of States which had enacted their own plans,
then the state statute "shall be ineffective" and state officers shall be authorized and
directed to act in obedience to the federal statute "as if acting under a statute of
this State." See the article cited in footnote 17-
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EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO PRICE v. NEAL:
The Virginia Solution in a Case of Double Forgery
Ca-ARLs R. McDOWELL
The case of Central National Bank of Richmond v. First and Mer-
chants National Bank of Richmond' presents such an unusual factual
situation as to be unique.2 Certain fraudulent parties, desiring to get
possession of money standing to the credit of one Justin Moore in the
Central Bank, forge Moore's name as drawer of a check on the original
depository bank (Central Bank) and deposit it in the second bank
(Merchants Bank) to the credit of the same man, Moore. They then
forge checks on Moore's account in the Merchants Bank in order to
withdraw the funds for their own use. It is not at all unusual for a
forger to put money fraudulently withdrawn from the first bank into a
second bank and allow it to remain there for a short time before with-
drawing it from the second bank. The device is apparently thought to
lull the first bank into security, the theory being that the original bank
i.ill be less suspicious of a transaction which simply transfers funds to
another solvent bank than it is of a transaction involving direct pay-
ment of cash. In the ordinary case, however, the money fraudulently
checked out of the first bank is placed to the forger's own credit in the
second bank and later withdrawn from the second bank by checks
drawn in his own name. In the ordinary case of this type, therefore, the
first check is a forged check but the second is not. While strange factual
situations are likely to arouse a certain amount of himan interest
among members of the legal profession, such cases are not always im-
portant as far as the legal problems are concerned. The unusual device
employed by this forger, however, has obliged the Court of Appeals of
Virginia to review the whole problem of Price v. Neals and to take a
position as to the true meaning of Section 62 4 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law.
1171 Va. 289, z98 S. E. 883 (1938).
2The opinion states that exhaustive briefs by able counsel fail to disclose a case
closely in point.
'3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5624: "The acceptor by accepting the instru-
ment engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance, and ad-
mits-. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his ca-
pacity and authority to draw the instrument, and 2. The existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse."
[Vol. I
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The problem is: Since Section 62 of the N. I. L. is simply a direct
copy of Section 54 of the English Bills of Exchange Act, which in turn
is a legislative declaration of Price v. Neal, and since the English Courts
had declined to recognize certain equitable exceptions to the Price v.
Neal doctrine which had grown up in the various jurisdictions in the
United States, did the passage of Section 62 of the N. I. L. constitute a
statutory abolition of the equitable exceptions to the Price v. Neal
doctrine?5 The significant point in the case, therefore, is that Virginia
has added itself to that list of jurisdictions which take the view that
the passage of Section 62 of the N. I. L. has not abolished the so-called
equitable exceptions to the Price v. Neal doctrine.
6
So far as necessary to the main point involved, the facts .may be
given as follows: A fraudulent party, who called himself Clancy, learned
that one Justin Moore had a substantial checking account with the
Central Bank. He forged Moore's name as drawer of a check for $85oo
on the Central Bank and deposited it in the Merchants Bank to the
credit of Moore. Previous to the time of this transaction, Moore already
had a substantial checking account with the Merchants Bank.7 Central
Bank paid the full amount of the original check through the clearing
house to Merchants Bank. Clancy later withdrew $8149, or all except
$351 of the $8500, from the Merchants Bank by checks to which Moore's
name was forged. Moore discovered the forgery of the $85oo check and
demanded that the Central Bank recredit his account for that amount.
Central did recredit Moore's account s and demanded of Merchants
that they return the $85oo. Merchants refused and Central brought suit
against Merchants for money had and received under mistake. Mer-
chants' main defense is that under the rule of Price v. Neal and Section
62 of the N. I. L., Central is not entitled to recover because of its legal
responsibility for recognizing its own depositor's signature. The case
was tried under a stipulation that neither party was guilty of any fac-
tual negligence, the forgeries in both instances being clever forgeries
upon Moore's own blank checks stolen from Moore's office. The trial
court gave judgment for the plaintiff bank for so much of the $85oo as
"See full discussion by Crawford D. Henning, The Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (1911) 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 471, 497.
6For recent cases see Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel,
1938). For earlier cases see Note (19o7) 1o L. R. A. (N. S.) 49.
'Except for this fact it might be argued that the method employed in withdraw-
ing the money from the second bank did not constitute a forgery.
8At the time Central recredited the account, Central took an assignment of
Moore's claim against the defendant. A considerable portion of the opinion relates
to the assignment but is unnecessary to the point herein discussed.
1940]
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had not been checked out of the Merchants Bank, or $351. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court and gave the plaintiff Central Bank
judgment for the full amount of the original check, or $8500.
In his opinion, Justice Spratley takes the following position: Vhere
the original bank pays to the second bank money on checks drawn on
the first bank to which the drawer's name has been forged, and the
second bank has paid out all of the money on authentic checks, the so-
called rule of Price v. Neal or the rule of Section 62 of the N. I. L. pre-
vents the original bank from recovering; but where the money paid by
the original bank is still in the second bank, the original bank may re-
cover. Next, since the $8149 paid out by Merchants were mispayments
on forged orders, the court must treat the case as if the $85oo was in
fact still in the Merchants Bank. Ergo, the court says that the plaintiff
Central Bank can recover the full amount of $8500.
The opinion, upon analysis, is syllogistic. It amounts to this: If the
money is still in the second bank, the original bank may recover it. The
$85oo is in legal effect still in the second bank, the second bank having
paid out its own money on forged orders. Therefore, the first bank can
recover.
A generation of lawyers taught to look at a syllogism out of the
corners of their eyes may react to the opinion with suspicion. They may
ask themselves: Was the money still in the Merchants Bank; had not
Clancy taken most of it and spent it? Was not the whole case decided
when the meaning was put into the minor premise? Was the court jus-
tified in treating the case as if the money were still in the Merchants
Bank when it was irrecoverably gone?
It is believed that the decision would have been more palatable if
the court had simply said that Virginia is hereby deciding, as a matter
of policy, to take its position among those states which hold that the
established American equitable exceptions to the Price v. Neal doctrine
have not been abolished by Section 62 9 of the N. I. L.; that before the
N. I. L. there was respectable authority to the effect that a negligent
defendant was ineligible to invoke Price v. Neal as a defense in a suit
for money had and received under mistake of fact,10 and that the legal
9Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5624.
2In the opinion in American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Industrial Savings Bank, 242
Mich. 581, 219 N. W. 689 (1928) the following cases are cited as applying to so-called
equitable exceptions: Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, So Wash. 484, 71
Pac. 43 (19o2), 6o L. R. A. 955 (19o3); Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 33
(1820); American Express Co. v. State National Bank, 27 Okla. 824, 113 Pac. 711, 33
L. R. A. (N. S.) 188 (911); Woods v. Colony Bank, 114 Ga. 683, 40 S. E. 72o, 56'
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negligence of the Merchants Bank in allowing the money to be with-
drawn on forged orders prevented it from invoking the rule of Section
62 as a defense to this suit for money had and received under mistake.
Section 62 is a rather vague section of the N. I. L. So far as the prob-
lem of this case is concerned, Section 62 simply says that an acceptor by
accepting "admits" the genuineness of the drawer's signature. Since
payment of a check is held to have the same effect as a certification for
future payment, 1 our problem is: Since Central Bank "admitted" to
Merchants Bank that the signature to the original $8500 check was the
authentic check of Justin Moore, what was the legal effect of such
"admission"? Did Central by admitting the signature make such an ir-
revocable guaranty of the authenticity of Moore's signature that Cen-
tral would be absolutely barred from bringing the matter up, regard-
less of the negligence of the Merchants Bank; or, on the other hand,
did Central simply make a representation implied-in-law or a holding
out implied-in-law which would be the basis of an equitable estoppel
in the event that Merchants was injured by reasonably and non-
negligently relying upon such representation? If Central's admission
means nothing more than a legal representation, then it may be rea-
sonably contended that Merchants did not reasonably and non-negli-
gently rely upon such holding out, because it was itself guilty of legal
negligence in allowing the money to be checked out on forged signa-
tures of the drawer.
In Louisa National Bank v. Kentucky National Bank,' 2 decided by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1931, where the drawee (Catletts-
L. R. A. 929 (1902); Continental National Bank v. Metropolitan National Bank, 107
III. App. 455; Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va. 545, 66 S. E.
761 (19o9), 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605 (1912).
"In First National Bank of Portland v. U. S. National Bank of Portland, ioo Ore.
264, 197 Pac. 547, 552, 14 A. L. R. 479, 488 (1921) the following words appear: "It
will be observed that in § 7854, Or. L., [Sec. 62 N. 1. L.] the word 'accepting' and
not the word 'paying' is employed in the statute; and yet in all the states where the
question has been presented, except the state of Pennsylvania, where a different
course of legislation has produced a different result, and except in South Dakota...,
the courts have ruled that Section 62 is merely a legislative affirmation of the rule
announced in Price v. Neal, and that this section includes the payment as well as
the acceptance of a negotiable instrument on the theory that the section was intended
as a legislative adoption of the entire doctrine of Price v. Near." Also see case in
Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 761.
1239 Ky. 302, 39 S. W. (2d) 497 (1931).
It is noteworthy that the courts in cases like the Louisa Bank case require a
higher standard for eligibility to plead Price v. Neal as a defense than is required of
a purchaser to qualify as a holder in due course. The purchaser of bearer paper may
qualify as an h.d.c. without having the transferor identified. Goodman v. Simonds,
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burg Bank) had paid a check to the Louisa Bank under a forged drawer
signature, and the Catlettsburg Bank sued for money had and received
under mistake, the court allowed a recovery because the defendant
Louisia Bank had negligently cashed the check without having the
fraudulent transferor identified. The Kentucky court said:
"Some... [courts] hold that the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law adopt the rule in Price v. Neal, free from the
exceptions which the courts have grafted onto it.... Others hold
that the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law is merely a legis-
lative affirmation of the rule of Price v. Neal with the equitable
exception.... The exception is not expressly included.... Nor
is it abrogated."' 3
It will be noticed that while the Kentucky court used the terminol-
ogy of equitable exception, the result is the same as if the Kentucky
court had talked the language of estoppel. The drawee-payor bank
would have recovered if the Kentucky court had simply said that Sec-
tion 62 provided that the drawee's paying a check constitutes an im-
plied-in-law representation that the signature was genuine and that
the defendant's negligence prevented it from establishing reasonable
reliance. The only real difference between the Kentucky case and the
principal case is that in the Kentucky case factual negligence on the
part of the defendant bank was found in its cashing the check without
identifying the fraudulent transferor, whereas, in the principal case, the
court found legal negligence in the defendant's allowing the money to
be withdrawn on forged signatures.
Several different theories concerning the reason for the original rule
of Price v. Neal are discussed and analyzed by Mr. Woodward in his
textbook on the law of quasi-contract.14 Among them appears the so-
called "Change of Position Theory" which is in effect the same as the
estoppel theory. Mr. Woodward rejects this theory in favor of the view
that the reason for the rule lies in a general rule of policy-a broad
policy of promoting security by regarding payment as final and irre-
vocable so far as possible. But whatever may have been the original
reason for the rule, an examination of the cases in Beutel's recent re-
2o How. 343, 15 L. ed. 934 (U. S. 1857). The apparent inconsistency is perhaps ex-
plained by the fact that the law of negotiable instruments is seeking to promote free
transfer as far as possible, whereas the law of quasi-contracts is based upon broad
equitable doctrines. While the problem of the Louisa Bank case involves an N. I. L.
section it is ambiguous and is interpreted in the light of quasi-contract law.
"Louisa Nat. Bank v. Kentucky Nat. Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 39 S. W. (2d) 497, 500-501
(1931).
"4Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (1931) §§ 81-88 inclusive.
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vision of Brannon on Negotiable Instruments indicates that there is a
definite tendency for the courts to hedge about the doctrine with equi-
table limitations15 and to arrive at the same result as if they actually
said: "Payment by the drawee bank amounts to a representation im-
plied-in-law to the effect that the drawer's signature is genuine, which,
if reasonably and non-ndgligently relied upon by the bank receiving
payment, may estop the plaintiff bank to show that the money was paid
under mistake to the extent of the reasonable reliance, but not in case
of negligent reliance, nor beyond the extent of detriment actually
suffered."
That there is a trend toward reliance as a necessary element of the
defendant's right to invoke Price v. Neal or Section 62 as a defense to
a suit for money had and received, is indicated by the following cases.
In American Surety Company of New York v. Industrial Savings
Bank,16 where the collecting bank had been paid by the drawee bank
on a drawer's forged signature and had given the fraudulent party
credit which had not been drawn out, the defendant collecting bank
was held ineligible to invoke Section 62 as a defense. There was no re-
liance upon the representation. Again, in First State Bank & Trust
Company v. First National Bank of Canton,'7 the court protected the
collecting bank to the extent of its reliance before notice. The Illinois
court permitted a recovery for so much of the money as had not been
withdrawn, and no more.
It is well to remember that these cases are to be decided under the
broad equitable principles of quasi-contract law so far as they are not
dearly modified by the statutory enactment found in Section 62 of the
N. I. L., the general rule of quasi-contracts being that money paid un-
der a mistake of fact may be recovered by the payor from the recipient.
It is well to remember also that the so-called rule of Price v. Neal is not
really an affirmative rule but a statutory exception to the general rule.
Therefore, to say that there are exceptions to the rule of Price v. Neal
amounts to saying that there are exceptions to the exception. By creat-
ing exceptions to the exception, we bring ourselves by circuitous and
2'See Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed., Beutel, 1938) 769 for col-
lection of cases decided under N. I. L. Mr. Beutel says: "Only two cases, however,
have been found, namely, National Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics American Nat.
Bank, 87 Neb. 841, 128 N. W. 552, and State Bank v. Cumberland Savings, etc., Co.,
168 N. C. 6o5, 85 S. E. 5, L. R. A. 19i 5D, 1138, not citing the N. I. L. which seem to
hold that the drawee can not recover, even though the holder was negligent."
"242 Mich. 581, 219 N. W. 689 (1928).
27314 Ill. 269, 145 N. E. 382 (1924).
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awkward thinking back into the original affirmative rule. It would seem
simpler to think of Price v. Neal as merely a statutory exception to the
broad rule that money paid under mistake may be recovered and to
regard the so-called equitable exceptions to the so-called Price v. Neal
doctrine as mere qualifications of the statutory exception. The question
then becomes understandable and free from confusion. Shall we say
that the statutory exception to the general rule found in Section 62 is
limited to cases in which the defendant collecting bank has reasonably
and non-negligently relied upon the implied-in-law representation
found in Section 62; or, should the exception be broadened to amount
to an absolute guaranty of the drawer's signature irrespective of free-
dom from negligence or reliance? Virginia in deciding the Central Bank
case has limited the Price v. Neal exception to cases which show a
meritoriousness on the part of -the receiving bank justifying what
amounts to an estoppel. Thus far, the writer approves the case.
Whether the court has made a proper application of the rule is more
questionable. The present writer leaves the case with the feeling that
a man on a log would have thought that the Merchants Bank never
would have been subjected to any responsibility for determining the
authenticity of Moore's signature if Central had not gotten them mixed
up with the "crooks." If that is a straddle, the only answer is that a
system of law which never divides losses between equally innocent part-
ies is likely in such a case to make straddlers or "rationalizers" of us all.
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